In its campaigning, the SMART labor union has made extensive reference to Kingspan and the Grenfell Tower Inquiry into the tragic fire in the UK in 2017 in which 72 people lost their lives. Kingspan supports the Grenfell Tower Inquiry process and continues to play an active role in assisting its investigation. The past issues raised about Kingspan’s Insulation UK business at the Inquiry have been comprehensively addressed and are fully explained at our dedicated Inquiry microsite here.
Latest statement from Kingspan dated Sept 4 2024
The report published by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (following the evidence heard during Phase 1 of the Inquiry) found that “the principal reason” for the rapid spread of the fire was the presence of the polyethylene cored ACM cladding, not the insulation[1].
This finding has been confirmed by recent expert evidence in Phase 2 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry[2][3], and independently verified by the UK Government’s own fire safety testing in August 2017[4]. However, regrettably, the SMART labor union conspicuously fails to acknowledge this critical finding in its communications.
In addition to this key UK Government Inquiry finding, there are several important facts which deserve highlighting:
- K15 was used in a cladding system that was not compliant with building regulations, and which should never have been used;
- K15 was used without Kingspan Insulation UK’s knowledge; and
- Kingspan’s K15 insulation boards made up approximately 5% of the insulation layer used in the cladding system on the tower after being substituted for the specified insulation by the contractor.
According to the Inquiry and its experts, the fire performance of the cladding system would have been similar regardless of the type of insulation used.
The Inquiry’s Phase 1 report[5], and evidence of the Inquiry’s experts, have been very clear that the principal reason for the rapid fire spread was Arconic’s Polyethylene cored ACM cladding used on the exterior of the building. This product, described by Inquiry experts as “presenting extreme fire hazard”[6], was not made by Kingspan.
Evidence by the Inquiry’s own experts demonstrates that the fire performance of the cladding system would have been similar whether combustible or non-combustible insulation was used[4][6]. To quote one of the many contributions on this point by Professor Luke Bisby (technical expert to the Inquiry):
“…burning of the ACM’s PE filler/core, rather than burning of combustible insulation, is – by a considerable margin – the critical issue in the fire performance of cladding systems incorporating ACM PE rainscreen panels. This is regardless of the type of thermal insulation used for the cavity’s opposing face.”[2]
To the extent insulation “contributed” to the speed of the fire spread, the relevant contribution relates not to its combustibility – as speculated by many – but to its thermal properties in stopping heat escaping from the system. Accordingly, this effect would have been the same for non-combustible insulation.
It is therefore inaccurate to use the combustibility of the insulation on the tower as a means to infer that combustible insulation is inherently unsafe.
The extreme fire hazard that the Arconic cladding panels created meant that even if non-combustible mineral wool insulation had been on the tower, regrettably, the tragic results would have been the same.
Kingspan condemns the wholly unacceptable past actions after it learned of them.
Irrespective of the above facts and findings, certain wholly unacceptable past actions in testing, marketing and advice became known during the course of the Inquiry discovery process. Kingspan promptly investigated the actions and took steps against those involved. Steps were also undertaken to ensure that every employee understands the conduct and behaviors that are expected of them. While evidence to the Inquiry has shown that such conduct was not in any way causative of the fire, Kingspan has sincerely and publicly apologized for these actions by a small group of employees at our Kingspan Insulation UK business. Kingspan has also condemned such behaviors in the strongest terms and stresses that they in no way reflect our culture or values.
On February 19 2021, Kingspan Group published a comprehensive response to these past issues, including extensive governance measures with respect to product testing and marketing, which are being implemented in every Kingspan Group business worldwide, not just in the Kingspan Insulation UK business where they occurred.
[1] Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report, Paragraph 2.13a available here: “The principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up, down and around the building was the presence of the aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores, which acted as a source of fuel. The principal mechanism for the spread of the fire horizontally and downwards was the melting and dripping of burning polyethylene from the crown and from the spandrel and column panels, which ignited fires lower down the building. Those fires then travelled back up the building, thereby allowing the flame front to progress diagonally across each face of the tower.”
[2] See report of Professor Luke Bisby “Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Experiments Work Package 2 - System Interactions” here particularly paras 685, 690 and 695, for example: “…burning of the ACM’s PE filler/core, rather than burning of combustible insulation, is - by a considerable margin - the critical issue in the fire performance of cladding systems incorporating ACM PE rainscreen panels. This is regardless of the type of thermal insulation used for the cavity’s opposing face.”
[3] See transcript for Professor Luke Bisby’s evidence to the Inquiry on 9th June available here, for example page 181, lines 12-18: “You can see that all cases that involve insulation of the cavity are broadly similar, whether the insulation was combustible or not, and whether foil facers were present or not. So for the RS5080, the 5100, the K15 and the mineral wool, with and without foil, you end up with a total heat release that is broadly similar.”
[4] See for example the first and second BS 8414 DCLG test reports which combined a polyethylene cored ACM with combustible insulation (test 1) and non-combustible insulation (test 2) respectively, with both combinations failing the test.
[5] Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report paragraph 23.52 available here: “I am satisfied that, although many different factors played a part, the principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up the building was the presence of the ACM panels with polyethylene cores, which had high calorific value, melted and acted as a source of fuel for the growing fire.”
[6] See transcript for Professor Luke Bisby’s evidence to the Inquiry on 9th June available here, page 185, lines 15 and 16: “It’s clear that Reynobond PE ACM presents extreme fire hazards.”